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DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL
HughJ. McCann

Libertarian treatments of free will face the objection that an uncaused
human decision would lack full explanation, and hence violate the principle
of sufficient reason. It is argued that this difficulty can be overcome if God,
as creator, wills that I decide as I do, since my decision could then be
explained in terms of his will, which must be for the best. It is further
argued that this view does not make God the author of evil in any damaging sense. Neither does it impugn my freedom. God's creative activity
does not put in place any secondary causes that determine my decision;
and his will does not stand as an independent determining condition either,
since it is fully expressed in my decision alone.

Libertarian treatments of free will are often held to involve a violation of
the principle of Sufficient Reason: they purport to explain my choices in
terms of my motives and beliefs, but they are ultimately unable to explain
why I chose as I did for the reasons I did, rather than making an opposite
choice for opposite reasons. One possible solution to this problem is to
invoke divine sovereignty. If, as creator, Cod is responsible for my choices,
then even though they are not subject to deterministic law they still have a
full explanation. For if my own reasons for choosing as I do are not completely explanatory, Cod's reasons for ordaining that I shall so choose presumablyare. And there are independent theological grounds for thinking
Cod is sovereign in this way. But there are two major objections to be
faced. One has to do with the problem of evil. Libertarian theories of freedom are attractive in part because they promise to exonerate Cod from
responsibility for moral evil. But if He creates our choices, then it seems
He must be responsible for any evil they involve. The second objection is
related: it may be wondered how I can even claim to have libertarian freedom and at the same time hold that Cod has complete sovereignty over
every exercise of my will. I shall spend more time with this objection. I
think it can be answered at least in part, and I want to suggest a way in
which it might be defused completely.
l. The Libertarian's Problem

Claims of libertarian freedom may be made both for the mental act of
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forming an intention and for the volitional activity by which the intention
gets executed, but since the former presents the clearer case, I shall concentrate on it. Paradigmatically, we form intentions through acts of decision,
which terminate episodes of practical reasoning. This does not mean
every decision must be preceded by lengthy deliberation, but it does mean
that decisions are not made blindly. However quick or careless they may
be, they are taken in light of considerations that offer at least putative justification for them, and which provide ingredients for explaining both the
decision itself and the action that ensues. If, for example, I wish to decide
where to take a vacation, I need to be aware of some options, and of the
considerations that make them attractive. A trip to Colorado might appeal
to me because it affords the chance to go skiing; a visit to New York might
present desirable cultural opportunities. Let us suppose I decide on
Colorado. The considerations on which my decision is founded may be
summarized in a practical syllogism:
Would that I go skiing.
I can go skiing if I vacation in Colorado.
Therefore, I shall vacation in Colorado.
It is important to realize that this is only a summary. There may be
numerous aspects to a skiing trip that I find attractive, and I may have in
mind a fairly detailed plan for the proposed vacation.' In other respects,
this sort of practical syllogism seems to me to reflect pretty well the important features of reasoning to a decision. In particular, we should note that
this is not a piece of theoretical reasoning, made practical by its content. It
is practical through and through. The major premise is optative: it
expresses, not a belief on my part that a skiing trip would be desirable, but
rather the actual desire with which I experience the prospect of such a trip.
The minor premise encapsulates the plan I envision as achieving what I
desire. And the conclusion, which is thought in the modality of deciding,
records what I decide in light of the premises, which becomes the content
of the intention thereby formed.
This view of decision making fits well with libertarian accounts of freedom. Practical reasoning is made practical not by its subject matter or
underlying motivation, but by the very nature of the thinking that constitutes it. To reason practically is to be a decider, to be a settler of issues.'
And because decisions are not made blindly but rather require premises, a
decision is never a completely arbitrary event, bereft of any explanation.
For to think of anything in the optative mode is to perceive it as in some
way good, and we decide only in light of our optations.' The upshot of this
is that we form intentions only in light of a perceived good, and the intention formed by our decision is always to pursue the envisioned good that
prompted the decision. Hence even if deciding is an act exempt from
deterministic laws there will always be some explanation for it: a teleological explanation in terms of the putative good, and the envisioned means of
achieving it, that prompted the decision.
But how good an explanation? Proponents of determinist theories offer
two major complaints. The first concerns the connection between the
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premises of our practical syllogism and its conclusion. In order for the
premises to explain my decision to vacation in Colorado, they must constitute the reason for which I decided to go. And this is not guaranteed by the
mere fact that they accompany my decision. After all, I might have had
other reasons for vacationing in Colorado-for example, an obligation to
visit a relative-which did not figure in my deliberation at all. If not, then I
will have decided on the vacation for the sake of the skiing, but not for the
sake of satisfying my obligation. And, it is argued, the only \'>'ay to make
sense of the "for" here is to invoke nomic causation. The premises of our
practical syllogism can constitute the reasons for which I decided only if
the mental states of which they form the content caused me to decide.
Otherwise, my decision arises without any relation to my reasons, and so
cannot be explained by them.'
I cannot argue fully for it here, but I think this objection can be given a
satisfactory answer. What makes a set of reasons count as those for which
a decision is made is that the plan of action those reasons encapsulate
becomes the content of the resultant intention. My decision to vacation in
Colorado must, as we have seen, be made in awareness of motives and
beliefs that putatively justify it, and which, depending on their complexity,
embody a more or less developed plan of action. When I decide for these
reasons, that plan is conveyed into my intention: that is, the content of my
motives and beliefs is transformed into the content of my intention.
Furthermore, this occurs in such a way that those elements of the plan that
were the focus of my desire become the focus of my intention. If it is the
prospect of skiing that prompts me to go to Colorado, then my primary
intention in going will be to ski. If I saw other aspects of such a trip as
desirable-say, enjoying the mountain landscape-then that too will be
intended. Things I did not even think of, like visiting a relative, will not be
part of the plan and will not be intended at all. Finally, there will be those
elements of the plan I see as necessary to success, and hence voluntarily
accept, but which I do not desire, and perhaps even find undesirable, such
as driving on icy roads. These too enter the content of my intention, but
not as its primary focus. They are, as Bentham would say, obliquely rather
than directly intended. s In short, the structure of an intention reflects exactly the structure of the reasons for which it is formed. That is why we can
always tell an agent's reasons for a decision simply by investigating the
content of the resultant intention, and vice versa. To know what I mean to
accomplish by visiting Colorado is to know my reasons for deciding to go
there, and to know my reasons for I deciding is to know what J intended to
achieve. And of course none of this calls for relations of nomic causation."
If this is correct, then we have an account of what it is to decide for a
reason that does not run afoul of causal determination. So we can give
noncausal explanations of decisions in terms of the agents' reasons without
fear of invoking an underlying causal explanation. But the determinist can
still claim the explanation is inadequate, and that is the second objection
libertarians must face. Even if deciding requires that I be aware of options,
to say that my decision is undetermined is to say that my awareness of
those options, and the putative good of them, cannot finally explain my
decision. If I am free in the libertarian sense, then there is nothing in my
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nature or experience, nothing about the setting in which my decision
occurs, in terms of which an observer could reach a completely reliable
conclusion as to how the decision would go. And, the argument runs, to
the extent this is so we get a violation of the principle of sufficient reason.
Why should we have a world in which I reached this decision but not
another? After all, the cultural opportunities provided by New York gave
me good reason for vacationing there instead. Why, then, the decision to
go to Colorado? We can point, if we want, to the putative good I saw in
going there: the excitement of skiing, the beauty of the mountains, etc. But
of course there was putative good on the other side, too. And when the
question is why I opted in favor of one good rather than another-why I
chose Colorado for the sake of these reasons, rather than New York for the
sake of those-we seem to have no truly satisfying answer. I need not
have desired one course more than the other, and if I am free then ex
hypothesi that would not have settled things anyway. Nor can I be relied
upon always to do what I take to be best or obligatory, if those turn out to
be different from what I desire. In the end, then, the only reason we can
give for my settling upon Colorado is that that is what I decided. And that
is not enough. It is to say we could as well have had a different world, and
to offer no decisive rationale for the one we have. 7
II. A Theistic Solution

There is no denying the seriousness of this problem. In the physical
realm, satisfying explanations tend to be deterministic: they treat nature as
determining behavior. But if libertarianism is correct, things are the other
way around with us: certain of our actions-that is, our decisions-determine our nature. They set our projects, thereby forming our character and
structuring our lives. To surrender this point is to give up libertarianism.
But neither should one be satisfied with a situation where rational decisions count irretrievably as violations of Sufficient Reason-a principle
which, in the philosophy of religion especially, counts for too much to be
lightly set aside.' There is, however, a solution which if successful would
allow us to have things both ways. Suppose that God, as creator, is directly responsible for each of my decisions. If so, then even though my decision to vacation in Colorado was not determined by the rest of my nature,
it still has an accounting-an accounting in terms of God's plans, of the
good He sees in my deciding as 1 do. That is to say, what fully accounts for
my decision is not my reasons for it, but God's.
This may seem a desperate solution: dangerous in its theology, whimsical in its view of the world, and faced with decisive objections. But I want
to argue it is none of these things. Its theological credentials are actually
pretty good. There is scriptural backing in the God who hardens
Pharaoh's heart (Exodus 10:1), who is said by Isaiah to have wrought all our
works in us (Isaiah 26:12), and by Paul to work in us both to will and to do
of His good pleasure (Philippiilns 2:13). Such passages have often been seen
as requiring that God's agency underlie our own. Aquinas, in particular,
cites the Isaiah passage as requiring that God cause not just the power of
the will, but also its movement. 9 But Aquinas does not see this as under-
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mining our freedom; rather, he views God as an agent able to move the
will without violence. lO As first cause, God moves all causes both natural
and voluntary.
And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their
actions from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He
does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but rather is He
the cause of this very thing in them, for He operates in each thing
according to its own nature. 11
As for whimsicality, that would be a legitimate concern if the aim of this
view was to treat human decisions as related to God's creative activity in a
way different from other events-to call, that is, for exceptional creative
involvement on God's part, as an ad hoc device to make human decisions
fully explicable. But that was not Aquinas's position, nor is it mine. Just
the opposite: the aim is to place human decisions on a footing equal with
the rest of creation, as direct manifestations of the divine fiat in which all of
the world, in all of its history, is produced. Only such an understanding
accords God complete sovereignty as creator, and brings all that occurs
under His providence. For to the extent God does not exert active control
over my decisions, whether through other events or direct involvement,
He does not control them at all. He can therefore achieve His ends only by
reacting to what I do, and to that extent His plans are subordinated to
mine. In addition to weakening His sovereignty, this situation also threatens Cod's omniscience. It suggests He can know how I will act in the circumstances in which I am placed only by observing my actions. As creator, He is in the dark. He can know what the possibilities are, but if my
freedom makes for more than one, then even His knowledge of the world
He is creating appears to depend on my action-an unsatisfactory situation to say the least. 12 These problems can be avoided if God is able to exercise creative control in mv actual choicE'.
So divine sovereignty requires that God be in full control of my decisions. A sound understanding of creation seems to lead to the same outcome. The important thing to realize here is that Cod's creative activity is
as fully involved in the continued existence of the universe as with its
beginning, if it had one. That is, God's sustaining the universe is of a piece
with His producing it. There is no power of things to sustain themselves in
existence. Such a power would have to be a pure disposition, lacking any
supervenience base and any mechanism, active or passive, by which it
operated. There is no difference, definable or observable, between this sort
of power and no power at all. It is the eternal creative act of God which
alone is responsible for the existence of things, and the world's surviving
another second will be as much owing to God's creative activity as its
being here to begin with. n It is hard to see, however, how God can be
responsible for my existence at every moment without being responsible
also for my characteristics. As Malebranche observed, God cannot create a
physical object that is in no particular place, that is neither at rest nor in
motion, etc. All of these things need to be settled in the production of the
object. 14 And in the same way, it would seem, God cannot create me with
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an indeterminate will-that is, a will that is neither deciding to A nor not
deciding to A, that is neither committed to a given intention nor not so
committed, etc. So if my existence at the moment I decide to visit Colorado
is directly owing to God as creator, then so is my decision.
This view of creation does not, as far as I can see, undermine scientific
explanation. To say that God is entirely responsible for the existence of
things is not to say those things have no nature, or that the changes and
interactions they undergo cannot be described by scientific law. It does,
however, enable us to close the explanatory gap that attends libertarian
free choice. As far as its existence is concerned, my decision to vacation in
Colorado has the same cause any other event does-namely, God's creative action. What is different about it is that unlike physical events, it cannot be foreseen simply by knowing the nature of its accompanying events
or circumstances, even the deliberative events and states that precede and
accompany it. Instead, its character is settled only in the very event itself,
in the very deciding. My reasons permit a partial account of it, in terms of
the good I saw in this scenario of action. But they cannot explain it fully,
for as far as my own motives go I could have chosen otherwise. I might
have chosen some other course, in pursuit of some other good, with no
final justification for the choice. But if my decision is not just a manifestation of my ability to choose, but also of God's creativity, then His goodness
and knowledge can be invoked to fill this gap. He has a reason why I
should decide to vacation in Colorado, and unlike mine His reason will be
sufficient. For in contrast to me, God is fully aware of the ramifications of
all the choices J might make, and His perfect goodness ensures that He will
create only the best. 's So His reasons for having me decide as I do, whatever they are, will explain fully the occurrence of my decision, in terms of His
perfect goodness.
Admittedly, this does not tell us what are God's reasons for producing a
world in which I make the decisions I do. And in this life anyway, we may
not be optimistic about our ability to discern those reasons. Still less does it
provide what the determinist wants, which is a complete naturalistic explanation for my decisions. Nevertheless, I think it provides for a more satisfying version of libertarianism than is usually offered. If libertarian free
choice exists, then the sort of explanation the determinist wants for my
decisions-that is, a naturalistic explanation-is unavailable. And if the
alternative I am suggesting does not actually produce explanations for free
choices, it at least assures that there arc such explanations. It is this assurance, not the actual explanations, that is crucial to answering the objection
that libertarian free choice violates Sufficient Reason. Naturally, one can be
satisfied with the account only to the extent one accepts a theistic view of
the world. But within that context, it is reasonable to expect such an
account. The idea that there could exist a being like the Judeo-Christian
God, and yet that His existence should be dispensable to our understanding of the phenomena of the world strikes me as implausible, to put it
mildly. If the account of freedom I am suggesting works, then God's existence does make a difference: it lays to rest the most important objection to
libertarian freedom. That in itself would be an argument for theism.
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III. Moral Evil
But does the account work? There are two major objections that have to
be faced. One has to do with the problem of evil. Perhaps the most tempting theological reason for endorsing a libertarian view of the will is that
this appears to exempt God from blame for the moral evil in the world. If
the existence of our acts of will is entirely our doing and none of God's,
then He seems exempt from direct responsibility for any evil they involve.
He no doubt knew that in creating free beings He was risking moral evil.
Perhaps somehow He even foresaw as creator that it would appear. But
God's own will is not tainted by moral evil, for He never willed any of it.
We did that. The most God is responsible for is permitting us to do so.
Now the trouble with making our decisions the direct products of God's
creative activity is that it seems to undo this argument. Indeed, on the
view of creation I have presented God is directly responsible not just for
our forming evil intentions, but also for their execution, and for all the evil
consequences that result. How can a God this intimately involved in creation escape guilt for what is wrong in it? Certainly, on this account, He
would have to be the creator of sin itself.
Part of the answer to this objection is to realize that even the standard
free will defense does not exempt God from as much involvement in the
travails of the world as might be supposed. If we think of the category of
moral evil as covering not just wrong acts of will but also the harmful consequences that flow from them, we include in it much that involves natural
processes, and hence their creator. Suppose, for example, that I decide to
set fire to a church, and proceed to do so, causing great harm to those
inside. Whatever acts of will occur in this case, they would have no effect
without there being natural processes relating them to the ensuing harm.
And however we conceive those processes, God is involved. By my
account He is directly involved, being solely responsible for the existence
of all that is. That places the consequences of my acts of will very much on
a par with natural evil, for a lot of which God is presumably responsible in
any case. Would another view fare better? Not much. Even if we think of
God as only remotely involved in the production of natural events, my evil
decision cannot be efficacious without His cooperation. The world has to
allow methods by which I can conveniently set a fire; there must be oxygen available so that the church will burn; fire must be harmful to my victims; I have to survive from the moment I make the decision until I execute it, and the acts of will by which I do so must somehow yield the bodily motions through which I set the blaze. In none of these things is human
agency heavily involved, and in some it is not involved at all. But God's is:
it is He who made the world, and set in place its principles of operation; it
is He who sustains natural causes, or allows them to sustain themselves; it
is He who made those causes oblivious to my evil intentions, and who
refuses to intervene Himself to thwart my designs. On no account, then,
does God escape involvement in the consequences of my evil intentions.
In fact, by comparison with the degree of His involvement, mine seems relatively puny.
But what about my decision itself? Here, surely, is the true home of
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moral evil. Even if I had dropped dead an instant after making the decision moral evil would have occurred, whereas there would have been no
moral evil had the church burned because it was struck by lightening. So
moral evil lies preeminently in our deciding: in our adopting plans of
action that are wrong. Can God be exempt from being morally evil
Himself if it is by His creative fiat that we decide as we do? Of course He
can. In the first place, even though God creates me the person who decides
to burn down the church, He does not make my decision. I do. My decision, and any evil that lies with it, are predicated of me. What belongs to
God is His willing that I shall decide as I do, which is an altogether different matter. The plan God adopts in willing what I shall decide will be infinitely more detailed and extensive than mine, and His project far different.
To be sure, His plan will include my decision and, if He means for my plan
to succeed, its harmful consequences as well. But these need hardly be the
point of His plan. They may only be obliquely intended, as necessary to
some superior good God wishes to accomplish. There may in fact be compelling possibilities for the ultimate defeat of evil bound up with my willing wrongly. If so, then God's goodness is no more impugned by His creating me the person who decides as I do than a mother's goodness is
impugned by giving her sick child bitter medicine, or an employer is made
evil when business reverses force him to reduce his work force.
This approach to the problem of evil seems to me preferable to the standani free will defense. Besides diminishing God's sovereignty, the standard treatment raises difficulties about the extent to which, as creator, God
knows what he is about. And it still makes God responsible for creating a
world in which moral evil occurs, for allowing immoral choices in that
world, and for contributing as creator to their harmful consequences. It
seems to me that the same considerations that justify God in this degree of
involvement in moral evil would also justify his obliquely intending it, as
an inescapable part of a plan of creation the entirety of which is effected by
His creative will. If that is correct, then God's being the author of our free
choices does not preclude a satisfactory response to the problem of evil,
and it avoids the difficulties of the standard treatment.

IV. Sovereignty and Worldly Freedom
The second objection this view must face is that it provides for a full
explanation of our decisions only by finally destroying our freedom. The
whole point of libertarian freedom is that my actions are supposed to be
"up to me," in the sense that I am their author or originator, and I am
responsible for their occurrence. The thrust of the present view is that God
originates my decisions and actions, simply by creating me the person I
am. And it may well be doubted whether these two can be made compatible-whether, to paraphrase Aquinas, God can be the first cause of the
operations of my will, while I remain their voluntary agent. If He brings
about my decision to vacation in Colorado, the argument would run, then
surely I cannot decide otherwise, and similarly for burning down the
church. Hence I am not responsible for these deeds.
There is, of course, a quick answer available here. If what is meant by
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"freedom" in this objection is simply that my acts of intention formation
should not be subject to nomic determinism, then ex hypothesi I am free on
the view presented. My motives still influence my decision rather than
determining it, and making God the first mover of my will does not (as we
shall see more fully below) put in place some further event or mechanism
to which my decision is bound by natural law. If, on the other hand, freedom is supposed to include my being able to choose against God's creative
will for me, then this is a freedom neither the present view of creation nor
any other accords me. Indeed, short of God's action as creator, there is no
me to do any deciding, and the same act of His will that is responsible for
my being puts in place my decisions as well. Furthermore, this second sort
of freedom is surely something no one should ever want anyway. What
greater evidence of our fallenness could there be than the desire to be masters of our destinies in the way this sort of freedom implies?
But I do not think the objector would be satisfied. Perhaps there is a
possibility, remote as it may seem, that God as creator has no fully settled
will regarding our decisions, and so leaves indeterminate the world He
creates. If so, then even though our wrong decisions are not what He
would like, they do not oppose anything He actively wills for us. And it
might be thought that this is necessary, for even if making God the creator
of our choices does not raise problems of nomic determination, it could still
endanger our autonomy. Libertarian freedom requires more than the
absence of nomic determination. I could be involved in all sorts of undetermined events, even psychological ones, without any sense of freedom. I
could suddenly remember an old phone number, say, or have an accurate
vision of The Hermitage in May. And we can imagine that these events are
truly undetermined. It hardly follows that I would have the sense of
autonomy and control about them that I have about my decisions. More
likely I would feel they had befallen me, in ITmch the way other sudden
memories and insights do. The same does not hold of the operations of the
will. There is a subjective sense of freedom attending our decisions and
actions that does not accompany other experiences, regardless of whether
they are nomically determined. The real question is whether that sense of
freedom is justified if God, as creator, controls our decisions. To see
whether it is, we have to examine some of the elements in which it consists.
One of the most important aspects of the sense of freedom that attends
our decisions is intentionality. There is no such thing as an unintentional
decision. Rather, whenever we decide we mean to decide, and we mean to
decide exactly as we do: that is, we mean to form the very intention thereby formed. So when I decide to vacation in Colorado, I intend in so doing
to decide exactly that. A second and related point is that I would not take
my decision to be accidental. On the contrary: it is a self-contradiction
ever to assert of anyone that they accidentally, or inadvertently, or unintentionally decided to do anything. My decisions cannot befall me, or occur
by mistake; they have to be under my direction. '6 Or at least that is how
we take it to be, and because we do we are able to view deciding as a locus
of voluntary control by agents over their actions. When I decide to vacation in Colorado, I take myself to be exerting such control, to be settling the
issue of where, barring the unforeseen, I shall go. Part of this control lies in
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a fact noted earlier: that I always decide in cognizance of available options.
That is one of the things that prevents my being surprised by my decision.'7
But it is not all. When I decide, I see myself as a center of spontaneity in
the world. Rather than being controlled by my circumstances, I see myself
as exerting control over them. In particular, I see myself as freely determining which of my motives shall find fulfillment in my behavior. And
what makes this freedom libertarian is that in deciding, I see myself as controlling my decision itself: as settling the issue of whether it shall occur at
all, and what its content shall be. So when I decide to take my vacation in
Colorado, I am determining in that very act not just what I shall do about
my vacation, but also what I shall decide about it. That is what is implicit
in my decisions being intrinsically intentional and nonaccidental. If they
were not so our decisions would be things that befall us, and libertarian
freedom would reduce, even from the point of view of the agent, to blind
happenstance.
I take these features of deciding to be grounded in the phenomenology
of intention-that is, in the way it seems to us. And they are reflected in
the concept, in the fact that we never hear of anyone deciding to do something unintentionally or by accident. But of course they may be illusory.
For if I am to be the source of my decisions in this way, certain relations
between them and other events and states are ruled out, and whether such
relations obtain need not at all be phenomenally apparent to me. It is precisely for this reason that causal determinism stands as a threat to libertarian freedom. If the standard determinist account is true, then however
things may seem to me, my nature is so constituted that there are nomic
relations between my decisions and my motivational and belief states in
terms of which the latter explain the former. This is altogether different
from the situation with the practical syllogism, where it is the content of my
motive and belief states that explain my decision, and the explanation is
teleologicaL Here the states themselves do the explaining, and the explanation is nomological. That destroys libertarian freedom, because the
motives and beliefs in question antedate my decision, are sufficient for it,
and display none of the features of agency that have been described. T
could have no direct control over whether and what I decide once these
factors are finally in place." Far from my being able to control their influence through my decision, they are in fact controlling me. We might even
wish to say that if determinism is true then whatever the phenomenal
appearances may be, we never really decide anything.
Can the same sort of claim be made if God creates me the person who
decides as I do? I would urge that it cannot. In the first place, God's activity as creator does not antedate anything I do. One reason for this is His
eternity. In my understanding, God is a timelessly eternal being, who creates the entire world, including time itself, in a single act. The divine fiat is
the ontological foundation of my decisions, therefore, it cannot bear any
temporal relation whatever to them. Furthermore, the relationship
between my decisions and God's activity as creator is too close for there to
be temporal differences. Neither our acts of will nor anything else God
creates, including we ourselves, can be held to have existence independent
of God's act of creating us. God does not create us by engaging in an act of
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will which in turn produces us. That would require that there be principles of "laws" of creation governing the relationship between his action
and its products. If God were dependent on such laws in creation, His sovereignty would be impugned. If, on the other hand, He produced these
principles, or some mechanism of creation whose operation they record,
He might as well skip the intervening step and produce us directly. So
God does not create us or our works by means of commanding our existence, where this is conceived as a kind of causal device. Rather, His commanding our existence is our production, and we have our being in His
very act of creating us.
One upshot of this is that I cannot be done violence, either directly or
indirectly, by the creative act of God that puts my decisions in place.
Independently of the fiat that determines my decision to visit Colorado, I
have no existence whatever; nor is there any process, natural or otherwise,
through which the determination occurs. Nomically speaking, therefore,
my decision is still as free as it can be, and I am in no way acted upon in
reaching it. There is nothing else I would, or even could, have decided had
God not exercised His power, no process of practical reasoning with which
that power interferes, no duress under which I am placed. On the contrary, because the decision God wills for me is truly mine I really do determine, at least as far as any considerations having to do with this world are
concerned, what my course of action shall be. I decide in cognizance of the
options before me, and in light of my motives and beliefs about them. It is
in my decision that the question which of my motives I will attempt to fulfill is settled. And I have every right to feel spontaneous and controlling in
making the decision-again, at least as far as any natural considerations
go. For like all decisions, my decision to visit Colorado is intrinsically
intentional: in making it I mean to decide, and to decide as I do. In the
very occurrence of my decision, I actively and voluntarily commit myself
to it. Finally, because my decision is made in light of my reasons, it both
reflects and helps further to form my character. Hence there is every reason for myself and others to consider me responsible for it, and the good or
evil it may involve, and to try to encourage or discourage similar decisions
on my part in the future. J'i

V. Sovereignty and Freedom Before God
The above account may be viewed as a partial gloss on Aquinas' claim
that God wills the operation of our practical faculties in accordance with
our voluntary nature, and is in fact the cause of our choices being free. By
willing that we engage in acts that have the intrinsic features of decision,
God enables us to exercise spontaneous and voluntary control over our
worldly situation, while at the same time His own involvement prevents
the principle of Sufficient Reason from being violated. But it is too soon for
the libertarian to declare victory. For even if this account leaves me free
and in control of my decisions as far as secondary causes are concerned, it
does not place me in control of God's will, and His role in my decision may
be such as finally to destroy my responsibility. If, as I have claimed, God is
the ground of my entire being, then certainly I could not have made any
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decision at all but for His actively willing that I do so. And does this not
finally undo me? Even if, in deciding, I intentionally decide as I do, and
even if in so doing I settle the issue of my behavior as far as the world is
concerned, it seems clear that I do not settle it as far as God is concerned. I
am, it appears, nothing but His proxy in the whole business. And this
seems to destroy my freedom. However controlling my decision may have
been, it did not control God. So, all things considered, I could not have
done otherwise.
What is demanded here is a kind of absolute metaphysical freedom: a
situation in which, even though I am by nature limited in both knowledge
and appreciation of my actions and their consequences, I nevertheless
stand as their final ontological arbiter. One could argue that this kind of
freedom is necessary even for worldly responsibility: that as long as there
is a God behind the scenes directing my behavior, I am not accountable for
it even on earth. But the demand seems especially appropriate in the religious context, where typically I am viewed as responsible not just to other
creatures but to God Himself. We are not, after all, like characters in a
novel, whose transactions occur entirely within its boundaries. There, no
doubt, the author may make her characters free or determined as she
pleases, since in neither case will they offend against her or us. Their freedom will be as real as they are, and the critics will not complain that it is
bogus, in that all along it was the author who made the characters do what
they did. But with us it is different. When we choose, we transact with our
creator. Even in this world He is said to reward or punish our deeds, and
in the Christian as well as many other religious contexts we have an eternal
destiny for which we are responsible. And we might wonder how this is
possible if we are not the ultimate cause of our choices. If we can only
decide as God wills we decide, it seems unfair that He should allow us to
suffer for our choices. We cannot resist His will. So why, as Paul has the
Christians at Rome asking, does He still find fault? (Romans 9:19)
I do not know that I can offer a complete solution to this difficulty, but I
think it is possible to make real progress with it. It is based, I think, on a
misconception of the relationship between our own wills and God's in creating us. Our inclination is to think any exercise of God's will would have
to be separate from our own, and hence must stand as an independent condition given which our choices are fixed. And then, whether we choose to
call it nomic or not, we still seem to have a brand of determinism. Even
though the same fiat that puts my choices in place determines my very
existence, and even though this precludes violence being done to my will,
there is nevertheless an event-namely the exercise of God's own willgiven which my decision could not have been other than it was. And
whatever we might want to say about the temporal world, this appears to
undercut any legitimate claim that we are responsible on the eternal stage.
No doubt God, who owes us nothing, may save or condemn as He sees fit.
But desert is another matter, and)f that requires that we be free, the argument would run, then even divine determination must rule out free will.
I want to urge, however, that God's creative determination of my decisions does not rule out their being free, for in fact the determination and the
decision are one and the same. It was remarked above that the fiat of ere-
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ation cannot be viewed as a separate event from the effects produced in it,
since that would simply require a further exercise of divine agency to assure
that the supposed effect was produced. But what exactly is the relation
between creation and the created? If we take at face value the idea that
God's activity as creator can be modeled as a kind of command, then it
should be viewed as an exercise of will, not unlike our own exercise of will
when we make a decision. The difference is that whereas our willing, taken
in itself, has only mental import, the import of God's willing is real. We,
that is to say, and all that belongs to us exist not as metaphysical products of
God's willing, but as its content. It is here that the analogy of the author
and her characters is appropriate: we have our being in God, just as the
author's characters have their being in the world of her thoughts. The same
is true for our decisions. My decision to vacation in Colorado is not a distinct event caused by God's willing that I so decide. Rather, it is the very
thing God wills, the actual content of his act of commanding its existence.
But even this does not fully reflect the closeness between God's will and
ours. For we might accept the idea that our own being is enclosed within
God's act of creating us, yet still be tempted to think of it as only a part of
that act, as though the actual creating were still something apart from us.
Even with our own decisions this is not quite right. What makes it seem
right is that we often represent mental acts in a way that distinguishes the
attitude or modality of the thought from its content. My decision to visit
Colorado might be represented thus:
I decide: I go to Colorado.
Here the content of my decision is treated as a part of my thought, but as
though it were separated from the act or modality of thought that is my
deciding, making it appear as though the modality of the thought were a
kind of operation carried out upon the content. And we could try to portray God's role in my decision the same way:
Fiat: my deciding I shall go to Colorado.
Here the content is the real event of my deciding, but it is still represented
separately from the modality of the divine command, again suggesting
that God's creative activity is independent of my act of deciding, which
counts only as a kind of object or product of it.
But that cannot be right. Separating attitude and content in the case of
our mental acts has some justification, since the content that enters into a
given mental act is at times (and I think always, in the case of decision)
conceived in advance.
But even this is misrepresentative.
Phenomenologically, to decide is not to place a modality of thought in juxtaposition to an otherwise neutral content. It is to think the content in the
modality in question, so that it is permeated by it. Only when content and
modality are united is there a true decision, and the only representation
necessary is:
I shall go to Colorado,
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where this is understood to be through and through a matter of resolving.
And if we want to model God's creative activity after our acts of will, it has
to be thought of in the same way. The modality of creating, the fiat of God,
is held in the very products of creation. Just as my decisive resolve pervades my decision, so the creative power of God pervades what he creates.
His fiat is our very being, and the being of all that we do, not an activity
that occurs independently of its products. So the operation of God's will
that is manifested in my deciding I shall go to Colorado is just:
My deciding I shall go to Colorado.
There is nothing here that stands as a determining condition of my decision, short of the decision itself. Even taking the model of mental acts at
face value, then, there is reason to think it a mistake to view the divine fiat
as an element of creation that stands apart from our being, as a determining condition of it. A similar result can be gotten if we realize that even the
model of mental acts-albeit the preferred mode in both Scripture and tradition for representing exercises of God's power-has shortcomings. As
we have seen, creation cannot be a process. God is responsible for the
being of all that is, but He does not produce it by operating to change
something else, and He does not produce our decisions by operating on us.
Nor is it the case, really, that the thought modalities of command or desire
could be useful for God in the world's production. For until creation is a
success, God alone is available to fulfill the command or satisfy the desire.
So these aspects of the human will cannot be taken literally as representing
the creative act. In the end, I would suggest, what truly constitutes God's
activity as creator of the world is simply His being eternally given over to
serving as the ground of being for the world and all that belongs to it. And
the true manifestation of that is not some descriptive condition determining the nature of things, but rather their very existence. So as far as my
decision is concerned, God's creative activity does not, even on the eternal
level, stand as a determining condition which settles what I shall decide. It
is fully manifested simply in my deciding as I do.
Does it follow that God's activity in creating me the person who decides
to go to Colorado is identical with my so deciding? Not by standard theories of event identity, for those require that Identical events have the same
subject, and that is not so here. I alone am the subject of my decision. It is
predicated of me, and its defects are mine. What God does is create the
event of my deciding as I do. He is, as it were, the subject of my being the
subject of my decision-which is really just an expression of the point that
we have our being in Him. Because of this difference, God's intentions and
mine can be different, and His reasons can embrace much more. So even if
my decision is morally defective, God can view my making it as indispensable to a situation that is finally for the best. Yet none of this puts in place a
further event by which my decision is determined. It is true, of course, that
God's will in this cannot be opposed: I cannot decide other than God, as
creator, has me deciding. But since the only manifestation of His will in
this regard is my deciding, all that this limitation comes to is that I cannot
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decide anything else while at the same time deciding as 1 do. That, of
course, is not a limitation at all, and if libertarianism is true I am not determined by secondary causes either. Paradoxical though it may appear at
first, therefore, even though our decisions are set in place by the creative
power of God, we could, even on the eternal stage, have done otherwise.

VI. Conclusion
My claim, then, is that when He does not create determining secondary
causes of things, God's creative will is expressed entirely in the being of
what He creates, not in any further, metaphysical conditions that determine its nature. If, therefore, God chooses to create a being who decides
freely, in the libertarian sense, to undertake a specific course of action, it
will be so. As I have intimated, I am not certain how satisfying this solution will be found to be. But if it is correct, then even though God has complete sovereignty over the universe, we retain complete freedom in our
decisions, and full responsibility for them. What this responsibility comes
to is, of course, not a simple matter. It depends, among other things, on
exactly what the defect of our decisions that constitutes sin is, and how
notions of eternal reward and, especially, punishment are to be understood. Those must be issues for another time. But I would hope the view I
have tried to defend will discourage simplistic solutions. The pitfall in
according God complete sovereignty over creation is that it can leave us
thinking we have been short-changed, that our freedom is violated in our
very creation. One possible result is a kind of morbid predestinarianism,
in which we resentfully admit our sinfulness, accept our salvation with a
survivor's guilt, and then assuage both guilt and resentment by tallying the
numbers of the damned, condemning most of our fellows before God even
gets the chance. Alternatively, we may opt for a Pollyannaish universalism, in which since we were never really to blame to begin with, salvation
is more or less automatically extended to all, and everyone from Iscariot to
Eichmann is okay. If I am not mistaken, both these alternatives are ways of
refusing responsibility for our deeds, and both really make light of our sinfulness. A proper account of human freedom, I think, should acknowledge
the complete majesty and providence of God without in itself licensing
such results. If it works, the account I have proposed may be a step in that
direction. 21
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by Myles Brand in Intending and Acting (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
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2. The alternative is to treat practical reasoning as issuing in judgments
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York: Routledge, 1989), chapter 4.
3. The importance of positive motivation for rational action is emphasized
by Peter van lnwagen in "When is the Will Free?" Philosophical Perspectives, 3,
ed. I.E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1989),
pp. 399-422.
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which we could not be responsible.
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what I hope to do.
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15. Whether God must create the best world may be questioned. See
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16. Two senses of the term "accident" should be distinguished here. In
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agency. This is the sense in which a decision cannot be accidental. But an
undetermined decision might still be accidental in a second sense: it could be a
violation of sufficient reason. As far as I can see, these two senses are logically
independent. So I see no refutation of the determinist's objection to libertarianism in the fact that we never describe our decisions as accidental.
17. I might, of course, be surprised at my decision to go to Colorado in the
sense that I reach it in light of considerations that had not previously occurred
to me, and in violation of my prior expectations as to how I would decide. But
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